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whole. Pragmatic reliance upon existing facts as primary
bases of decisions may be gradually clearing the judicial
house of antiquated moral and legal conceptions. Unfortunately, it is not providing adequate philosophical substitutes.
It is seriously to be doubted whether men in general and
judges in particular can live by facts alone. The judicial
house, philosophically cleansed of outmoded conceptions, may,
like a certain other house scripturally described, become the
dwelling place of more and worse demons than the former
inhabitants. Since the judicial house is but an upper room
in the house of all of us, the custodianship of our nine berobed brethren is for us as well as for history a matter of
deep concern. In any event, the integration of the activities of individual judges with the flow of history has never
been more apparent than it is today.

JUDGES AS STUDENTS OF AMERICAN SOCIETY

Lynford A. Lardnert
Judicial biographies of recent years-particularly those
written by political scientists-are based on two assumptions:
that the social philosophy of the judge will be reflected in
his judicial opinions; and that his early life and experiences
had a controlling effect on the molding of the philosophy
which he read into the law as a judge. The result of a general acceptance of these assumptions has been a set of biographies giving in as much detail as possible the early life of
a justice, followed by an analysis of his judicial opinions, his
influence on the development of the law, and his position
in public life. However, there is one further aspect of a
justice's life which ought to be explored: Was the justice
a conscientious student of American society, and if so to what
extent? In the last analysis we are interested in judicial
biographies for the purpose of gaining a fuller insight into
the factors which have played an important part in influencing the Supreme Court, and thereby in influencing the development of American government.
The belief that a man's basic predilections, prejudices
and biases are fixed in the early years of his life is by now
f B.S. 1932, Northwestern University; Ph.D. 1938, Princeton University. Assistant Professor of Political Science, Northwestern University. Author of MR. JUSTICE BREWER (in preparation).
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well established. But basic theories must be applied to concrete situations. A man may solve essentially similar problems at different times in different ways and still be consistent with his basic belief. For example in 1895 Justice
David J. Brewer wrote a short article on the jury system
in which he advocated that a juror's day be no longer than
a laborer's day.' In making his point he wrote, "Eight hours
is today the demand of labor, and a wise demand too." And
yet ten years later he voted with the majority in Lochner v.
New York.2 In 1883, Justice Brewer, while a member of
the Supreme Court of Kansas, publicly advocated the prohibition amendment to .the Kansas Constitution. Three years
later, as a United States Circuit Judge he held, in the case
of State v. Walruff,' that a brewer who had been operating
a brewery in Kansas prior to the adoption of the amendment
could not, subsequent to the amendment's adoption, be forced
to discontinue his business unless compensation were made
to him by the state. The apparent inconsistency in virtually
nullifying by judicial decision a policy which he had earlier
advocated needs explaining.
Such inconsistencies are illustrative of many that can
be found in a close analysis of judicial decisions. These may
or may not be due to the fact that the judge involved has
become conscious of a change in the conditions surrounding
the problem to be solved-a change which he thinks dictates
a solution to the problem different from the one he made
earlier. In the light of these observations, it seems important to know whether or not a member of the Supreme
Court was inclined to make a blind application of his prejudices to concrete problems without reference to attendant
conditions. Have the members of the Court tended to play
by ear, so to speak, or have they been inclined to solve constitutional problems by an application of their basic philosophy to a reasonably thorough study and understanding of
the contemporary American scene?
This question must be explored in preparing a judicial
biography. For example, during his college years from
1852 to 1856, David J. Brewer had more than a casual interest in current political and social events. In fact his
1. 12 Washburn Midcontinent 2-3.
2. 198 U. S. 45 (1905).
3. 26 Fed. 178 (1886).
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interest was intense and enthusiastic. He was prominent
in a debating society at Yale, and his scrapbooks contain
copies of several letters of his which were published in the
Middlesex Republican-long and somewhat scathing letters
on such topics as the Dred Scott decision, the end of the
Pierce administration, and President Buchanan. These letters show an adequate knowledge of the pertinent facts, but
they do not reveal a tendency to careful and penetrating
analysis. While Brewer's interest in American politics in
later years did not diminish from that of his college days,
4
his attention to political facts did.
If the quality of training in political analysis which
Brewer derived from the debating society were of the
"cracker-barrel" variety, the fact must not be overlooked
that formal college education in politics at that time was not
much better.5 And in terms of modern standards, Brewer's
legal training was quite as meager-if not more so. After
a year spent as a clerk in the law office of his uncle, David
Dudley Field, he took the one-year law course at Albany
Law School where the curriculum was typical of legal instruction of those days.6 Brewer's work at the Albany Law
School was limited to a study of the following subjects:
Corporations, Contract of Sales, Negotiable Paper, Guaranty and Surety, Equity Jurisprudence, Pleadings, and
Criminal Law. Brewer's limited training in the law was
described by himself in an interview, in the following words:
4. This intense interest of Brewer was probably typical of that
of his judicial colleagues when they were students. Professor Fairman gives a very clear picture in his book, MR. JUSTICE MILLEa AND

THE SUPREME COURT, 1862-1890 (1939), of Justice Miller in his youth,
as an active member of a debating society-a picture quite similar to
that of Brewer. It was the day of debating societies.
5. For the most part the study of society in general, and politics
in particular, was made under the title "Political Philosophy." According to Miss Haddow's study of POLITICAL SCIENCE IN AMERICAN
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES: 1636-1900 (1939), Brewer's introduction

to a study of American society probably came in his senior year and
consisted of a two-term course devoted to a study of Wayland's POLITICAL ECONOMY (1837), Lieber's CrVIL LIBERTY AND SELF GOVERNMENT
(1853) (which had just been adopted at Yale), Kent's COMMENTARIES
(Vol. I 1826), lectures on the Law of Nations, and on the Constitution
of the United States. It was not until after Brewer's time that textbooks containing a more elaborate and systematic treatment of politics
began to appear and to be used widely.
6. In fact according to Miss Esther Lucile Brown in her LAWYERS
AND THE PROMOTION OF JUSTICE (1938), as late as 1860 all but a few

law schools confined their courses to one year.
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I was a raw youth, with a very inadequate legal education, even
though I had had a year in my uncle David Dudley Field's
office, and another year at the Albany law school, and I had

been-admitted to the bar at Albany without examination and
before I was quite twenty-one.

7

It is thus apparent that Brewer's formal education included neither a systematic, thorough analysis and understanding of the American scene nor even a cursory introduction
to the relationship between the law and society. Even in
his later life he seems to have made no conscious effort to
study and develop a more complete understanding of American society. According to an interview in 1901 Justice
Brewer was asked if he read much fiction, and was reported
to have replied, "Very little. . . Last summer I read 'To
Have and To Hold.'" Then when he was questioned about
his readings in economics and history, he replied, "Bless
me, no. It is one of the penalties of those who go on the
bench that they can read little of anything except law." 8
This raises an obvious inquiry: What were the other
possible means by which Brewer and other members of the
Court 9 could acquire an understanding of the conditions of
American society in which the law they were making had to
operate? Outside of information contained in magazines
and newspaper articles, it would seem that there were only
two probable means: practical experience as public officeholder prior to appointment to the bench or as a practicing
lawyer, and the arguments of counsel. A person in a nonjudicial public office, or a practicing lawyer certainly has
an opportunity to get a first-hand understanding of at least
some aspects of American society. Such an opportunity was
not available to Justice Brewer, for he spent practically the
7. Christian Endeavor World, Oct. 12, 1899.
8. Topeka State Journal, June 1, 1901. This picture of the character of the reading he did is reflected in the catalogue of books in
what remains of his library. These consist overwhelmingly of court
reports, legal encyclopedias, etc. There are a few books in the twenty
boxes which do pertain to the American scene. At least half of them
were sent to the Justice with the compliments of the author, and most
of them showed signs of not having been read: lack of notations and
marks, uncut pages, and bindings that were still stiff.
9. On the basis of my perusal of other judicial biographies, I
suspect that Brewer's limited reading was typical of the Court of his
and earlier times. Brewer may not be representative of his colleagues
in this respect, but if he is, then it is clear that Justices with the
intellectual curiosity of Brandeis, Holmes and Cardozo have been unusual on the Court.
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last forty-five years of his life in a judicial office. When
therefore, it became necessary for him to participate in adjusting the law to changing conditions, one may surmise that
he frequently had to depend upon members of the bar for
factual background, and for an understanding of the social
implications of the decision he was being called upon to make.
Of course such a reliance is the premise upon which the
"Brandeis Brief" was based.10 The example of Justice Brewer
and the inferences which may be drawn from other judicial biographies afford at least a partial explanation for
this reliance. Justice Brewer was surely not congenitally
indifferent to contemporary problems, nor was he unsympathetic to the desires of that portion of the American population which hoped for an improvement in its condition. He
sincerely believed that there were abuses by the wealthy and
by the laborer, but he did not have a sufficiently wide understanding of the essential nature of American problems of
his time to be able to make a penetrating and consistent
solution. Insofar as Justice Brewer and his colleagues were
not active students of American society I have the impression that they were typical of their time and generation.
Yet in view of the tremendous influence of the Supreme
Court on the development of American government and
the concomitant responsibility that rests on the members
of that Court, its members were not as well equipped as they
should have been.
The recent tendency of some law schools to give increasing emphasis to the study of extra-legal materials should
go far toward equipping future justices to be students of
American society. It would seem clear that a thorough
knowledge of contemporary social and economic problems
by the judiciary will become increasingly important if the
regular courts of law are to continue to exercise any significant power of review over the decisions of administrative
agencies which are intimately concerned with economic and
social conditions.
10. The well-established fact of dependence by the Court upon the

bar was demonstrated in another way in the very able study by Benjamin Twiss in his LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1942).

